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DOUBLE JEOPARDY-THE "SAME EVIDENCE TEST" APPLIED

Defendant was convicted of simple battery' and was later
charged with indecent behavior with a juvenile. 2 The state made
no claim that additional evidence was available to support the
charge of indecent behavior. The lower court sustained defendant's plea of double jeopardy, and the state appealed. The Louisiana supreme court held that the judgment of the trial court
was correct and affirmed. State v. Bonfanti, 262 La. 153, 262
So.2d 504 (1972). In another case, the defendant was charged
with simple robbery and theft.4 In a previous prosecution he
had been convicted of malfeasance in office.5 The trial judge
sustained the motion to quash the bill of information on the
basis of double jeopardy. The Louisiana supreme court held
that the trial judge was correct in holding that former jeopardy
should bar the second prosecutions. State v. Didier,262 La. 364,
263 So.2d 322 (1972).
Article I, section 9 of the Louisiana constitution states "nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for
the same offense . . . ." This language recurs in article 591 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure,6 and the United States Consti1. LA. R.S. 14:35 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1968, No. 647, § 1, reads
in part: "Simple battery is a battery, without the consent of the victim,
committed without a dangerous weapon."
2. LA. R.S. 14:81 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1968, No. 647, § 1, reads
in part: "Indecent behavior with juveniles is the commission by anyone over
the age of seventeen of any lewd or lascivious act upon the persons or in
the presence of any child under the age of seventeen, with the intention of
arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either person."
3. LA. R.S. 14:65 (1950) reads in part: "Simple robbery is the theft of
anything of value from the person of another or which is in the immediate
control of another, by use of force or intimidation, but not armed with a
dangerous weapon."
4. LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1968, No. 647, § 1, reads
in part: "Theft Is the misappropriation or taking of anything of value
which belongs to another, either without the consent of the other to the
misappropriation or taking, or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices or
representations."
5. LA. R.S. 14:134 (1950) reads in part: "Malfeasance in office is committed when any public officer or public employee shall: (1) Intentionally
refuse or fail to perform any duty lawfully required of him, as such officer
or employee; or (2) Intentionally perform any such duty in an unlawful
manner; or (3) Knowingly permit any other public officer or public employee, under his authority, to intentionally refuse or fail to perform any
duty lawfully required of him, or to perform any such duty in an unlawful
manner." See State v. Didier, 259 La. 967, 254 So.2d 262 (1971).
6. "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the
same offense ...
."

NOTES
tution contains similar protectionY Thus, it is fundamental to
the application of the concept of double jeopardy to define the
"same offense." Although an exact rule has not been stated,
the traditional formula used in Louisiana is essentially an adaptation of the "same evidence test." Under the original usage
of the same evidence test, the conviction or acquittal on the first
indictment would be no bar to the second conviction on another
charge unless the facts contained in the second indictment were
the same as those in the first.
The application of this test, however, has been less than
consistent in Louisiana. In an early case the offenses were defined as being the same if they arose out of the same act.'* This
position was soon abandoned, and in later cases" the court
stated as the general principle that "a former trial is not a bar
unless the first indictment was such that the prisoner might have
been convicted upon proof of the facts set forth in the second
indictment.' 2 The test, however, might be better defined in
terms of elements as illustrated in State v. Faulkner.'8 In that
case, the court stated that "'each indictment sets out an offense
differing in all elements from that in the other, though both relate to the same transaction.' ,'4 (Emphasis added.) The conclusion reached was that a conviction for obtaining money by
false pretenses did not preclude a second prosecution for embezzlement. The fact that different elements make different
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. Two Comments in prior issues of the Louisiana Law Review generally
concern the elusive definition of the "same offense." The latest, in 32 LA.
L. REV. 87 (1972), deals with a general overview of the various standards
employed throughout the United States to define the "same offense." An
earlier comment, 21 LA. L. REV. 615 (1961), deals primarily with article 279
of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure and the various jurisprudential
tests. Reference is made throughout this casenote to these articles in order
to familiarize the reader with broadly related areas of double jeopardy
not included in the narrow scope of this note.

9. This test was first stated in Rex. v. Vandercomb, 168 Eng. Rep. 455,
461 (1796): "[U]nless the first indictment were such as the prisoner might
have been convicted upon by proof of the facts contained in the second

indictment, an acquittal on the first indictment can be no bar to the second."
See LA. CODs CadM. P. art. 596, comment (a). See a/so Comment, 32 LA. L.
REv. 87, 90 (1972).
10. See State v. Cheevers, 7 La. Ann. 40, 41 (1852).
11. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 45 La. Ann. 936, 12 So. 932 (1893); State
v. Vines, 34 La. Ann. 1079 (1882); State v. Keogh, 13 La. Ann. 243 (1858).
12. State v. Faulkner, 39 La. Ann. 811, 812, 2 So. 539, 540 (1887).

13. 39 La. Ann. 811, 2 So. 539 (1887).
14. Id. at 812, 2 So. at 540. (Citations omitted.)
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crimes seemed to be the crucial issue in this application of the
test of double jeopardy.' 5
Two later cases are cited most often as manifesting the present Louisiana position on defining the same offense. In State v.
Roberts,' the court adopted the rule requiring substantial identity of offenses.' 7 It was also said that the evidence necessary
to support the second indictment had to be sufficient for the first
before double jeopardy could apply.'8 State v. Foster,9 restated
these rules. However, the court went further and held that independent crimes could be proved at the first trial as matters of
evidence to show that the defendant's act was committed willfully or maliciously and that this did not make these independent crimes elements of the offense charged. The test stated in
Foster was whether at the first trial there could have been a conviction for the offense prosecuted at the second.- In Foster,
acquittal for attempted arson did not preclude a later trial for
assault and battery, even though evidence proving the commission of assault and battery was introduced at the trial for attempted arson. These cases prescribe no clear rule, for even
though the court used language equivalent to the same evidence
test,2' it would seem that the evidence being presented on the
first trial was disregarded and reliance was placed on the fact
that the crimes were comprised of different elements; substantial identity of offenses was the controlling consideration in
ruling on the plea of double jeopardy.
15. In Faulkner the court further stated: "It has been held in numerous
cases that, where a particular act is of such a character as to constitute two
distinct crimes, conviction for one will not bar prosecution for the other."
Id. The court listed other examples of cases which would not be double
Jeopardy. One of these was "keeping a drinking-house" and "being a common seller of intoxicating liquors." This further illustrates the court's reliance on the fact that the elements of the crimes are different in making
their determination.
16. 152 La. 283, 93 So. 95 (1922).
17. The court stated that the rule is not "formal, technical, absolute
identity; the rule is that there must be only substantial identity, that the
evidence necessary to support the second indictment would have been sufficient for the first." Id. at 287, 93 So. at 96. For a dicussion of this test see
Comment, 21 LA. L. REv. 615, 622 (1961).
18. 152 La. at 287, 93 So. at 96.
19. 156 La. 891, 101 So. 255 (1924).
20. Id. at 898, 101 So. at 258.
21. See State v. Roberts, 152 La. 283, 287, 93 So. 95, 96 (1922): "that the
evidence necessary to support the second indictment would have been sufficient for the first."
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Article 279 of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure 22 did
little to clarify the definition of the same offense; the Louisiana
courts continued to apply the principles of Roberts and Foster
24
23
in later cases such as State v. CalvG and State v. Comeaux.
In Calvo the court restated the same evidence formula of the
earlier cases, but explained in depth that the true test to be
applied was whether the offenses were of substantial identity.
The defendant had not been charged with conspiracy or simple
robbery on the first trial, and neither conspiracy nor simple
robbery were responsive verdicts to murder.m For these reasons,
the defendant in Calvo could not have been convicted of those
crimes at the trial for murder, even though evidence substantiating the commission of robbery and conspiracy was presented.2 6
In Comeaux, the court cited Roberts and Calvo as authority
for the requirement that the offenses must be the same both in
law and in fact.27 It was found that the second charge arose out
of the same set of facts but that simple battery and attempted
murder were not the same in law, chiefly because of the different intent requirements for those crimes. Significantly, the same
evidence test was found not to be enough in itself to sustain a
plea of double jeopardy.
Article 596 of the 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure 28 provides a general statement of the scope of double jeopardy, but
it reaffirms the basic 1928 test and offers little assistance in de22. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 279 (1928): "[T]hat the offense formerly
charged and that presently charged are either identical or different grades
of the same offense, or that the one is necessarily included in the other."
See also Comment, 21 LA. L. Rav. 615, 622 (1961), for a discussion of this
statute.
23. 240 La. 75, 121 So.2d 244 (1960).
24. 249 La. 914, 192 So.2d 122 (1966).
25. The "responsive verdict" test was a court-announced requirement
which was also implicit in the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure. For a discussion of this test see 21 LA. L. REv. 615, 621-23 (1961). The responsive
verdict requirement was removed by LA. CODE CalM. P. art. 596.
26. State v. Calvo, 240 La. 75, 91-92, 121 So.2d 244, 248 (1960).
27. 249 La. 914, 920, 192 So.2d 122, 124 (1966).
28. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 596: "Double jeopardy exists in a second trial
only when the charge in that trial is: (1) Identical with or a different grade
of the same offense for which the defendant was in jeopardy in the first
trial, whether or not a responsive verdict could have been rendered in the
first trial as to the charge in the second trial; or (2) Based on a part of a
continuous offense for which offense the defendant was in jeopardy in the
first trial."
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fining the same offense.29 As recently as March, 1972, the Louisiana supreme court indicated an adherence to the mixed modifications as applied in the above cases, with emphasis on the
identity aspect. In State v. Thames,3 0 a per curiam decision,
acquittal of the crime of criminal damage to property 1 did not
preclude prosecution for battery.3 2 The crimes were found not
to be the same or "identical" offenses even though they arose
from the same transaction.-"
In the instant cases the supreme court found that double
jeopardy constituted a bar to prosecutions for a second offense.
In a per curiam opinion, the court in Bonfanti based its holding
that there could not be consecutive prosecutions for battery and
indecent behavior with a juvenile on an application of the same
evidence test as stated in Roberts and Foster; it also cited official revision comment (d) to article 596 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.3 4 It was specifically pointed out that the evidence
was the same for both prosecutions, that no new evidence was
introduced in support of the second indictment, and that the
defendant had been convicted of the same conduct, the unlawful
touching, in the first trial that he was charged with in the second.
In Didier, where prosecution was not allowed for theft and
simple robbery following a conviction for malfeasance in office,
the problem of how to define the same offense received more
comprehensive treatment. The same evidence test of Roberts
was cited as the rule in Louisiana, and the court held that the
second charge was for a portion of the same crime for which
the defendant was convicted in the first trial. The majority
29. Article 596 did, however, remove the responsive verdict requirement.
See note 24 supra and LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 596.
30. 261 La. 96, 259 So.2d 26 (1972).
31. BATON ROUGE, LA. CITY CODE 13:20 (1951)

reads in

part: "Whoever

intentionally damages, injures, or defaces any property of another or any
public property, without the consent of the owner, shall be fined ....
32. LA. R.S. 14:34 (1950) reads in part: "Aggravated battery is a battery
committed with a dangerous weapon."
33. State v. Thames, 261 La. 96, 99, 259 So.2d 26, 27 (1972) (Barham, J.,
concurring opinion): "Double jeopardy per se cannot be pleaded since the
two offenses charged . . . are not the same and do not require the same

elements."
34. LA. CODE CRIM. P. at 596, comment (d): "Clause (2) of the above Art.
596 is necessary to prevent multiple prosecutions for continuous offenses.
For example, possession of stolen goods or narcotics may continue over a
long period of time and may involve more than one object. Yet, obviously
there should be only one prosecution for what is in effect one criminal
course of conduct."
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stressed the fact that the foundation for the malfeasance conviction and the prosecution for theft and robbery was the same
evidence, stipulated to be the same, formed from the identical
conduct of the defendant. The use of the sheriff's office to further
the theft, making the defendant a principal to the theft, was the
identical conduct charged when the defendant was convicted of
malfeasance.
The court seemed compelled to illustrate what it was not
holding in its disposition of the Didier case. It was emphasized
that the "same transaction test,"3 5 requiring all crimes charged
arising out of one "criminal episode" to be tried together, had
not been adopted by the United States Supreme Court,3 6 or by
the Louisiana courts or statutes.37 Also stressed was the fact
that on the face of the respective indictments the second offense
was not included in the first because the elements of the two
crimes were not the same.3 8 Calvo and Comeaux were distinguished on the grounds that, although those decisions nominally
rested on the elements of the crimes being the same, the issue in
those cases was raised prior to trial. This, according to the court,
excluded the possibility of applying the same evidence test since
there had not been a second trial at which to present the same
evidence. 9 For that reason, whether the plea of double jeopardy
was to be sustained in those cases had to rest on whether the
crimes were comprised of different elements. It is submitted that
35. See Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE
L.J. 513, 527, 534 (1949); Comment, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965); Note, 7 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 79, 84 (1937). But see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), holding
a theory of collateral estoppel to be binding upon the states. See also Note,
31 LA. L. REv. 540, 546 (1971).
36. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring
opinion): "I wish to make explicit my understanding that the Court's opinion in no way intimates that the Double Jeopardy Clause embraces to any
degree the 'same transaction' concept reflected in the concurring opinion
of my Brother BRENNAN."
37. See LA. CODE CriM. P. art. 596, comment (a). See also Comment, 32
LA. L. REv. 87, 92 (1972).
38. Authority was also cited to support the proposition that evidence
of the second crime could be introduced in the trial for the first crime
for the limited purpose of proving the guilt of the offense charged. See
State v. Boudoin, 257 La. 583, 243 So.2d 265 (1971). See also State v. Foster,
156 La. 891, 101 So. 255 (1924).
39. The application of the same evidence test in this manner could be
styled the so-called "backwards test." For a discussion of this version of
the same evidence test see Comment, 32 LA. L. REV. 87 (1972). See also
Comment, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 273 (1965); Note, 7 BROOKLYN L. REV. 79, 83
(1937).
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the distinguishing of these two cases on the grounds given is
somewhat tenuous, considering the method by which the instant
cases came before the supreme court for review. Bonfanti was
an appeal by the state from a sustained plea of double jeopardy
in the district court and Didier an appeal by the state from the
sustaining of a motion to quash by the trial court. The dissenting
opinion in Didier relied heavily on Calvo and Comeaux explaining that these cases stand for the proposition that the test is
whether the offenses, not the acts, are the same. The dissent
urged that the in law and in fact test should be applied to define
the same offense rather than the same evidence approach of the
majority.
A majority of Louisiana double jeopardy decisions have indicated an adherence to a loosely stated same evidence test.40
However, so many other tests, or combinations of tests, have been
applied that it is impossible to state with certainty the Louisiana formula for defining the same offense. 41 The holdings in
Bonfanti and Didier should provide much clarification in this
area. In these decisions the court was consistent in not applying
the in law and in fact test of Calvo and Comeaux. In Bonfanti,
the court gave great weight to the fact that the same act of the
defendant had been charged as criminal in both the first and
second prosecutions. Likewise, in Didier, it was the same conduct of the sheriff which had been twice put on trial. It might
appear that the court applied some form of the same transaction test, but it is explicitly stated that the same transaction test
is not applicable in Louisiana law. The same evidence test was
reaffirmed as the true test in Louisiana, but Calvo and Comeaux
were distinguished rather than overruled.4
It is clear that the emphasis will no longer be on the mere
definition of crimes contained in the statutes. What will be
considered is the conduct of the defendant upon which the dual
charges are based. If there is more than one act violating more
40. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 596, comment (a). See also Comment, 32
LA. L. REv. 87, 90 (1972).
41. See LA. CODE CruM. P. art. 596, comment (b).
42. One conclusion which could be drawn from this is that the court
might adhere to a dual standard. The In law and in fact test would be
applied if the court were faced only with the separate indictments; the
same evidence test if the evidence for the second trial were available.
This, however, would be an artificial distinction. Production of the evidence
could then be required, thus making it available, on a motion to quash on
the grounds of double jeopardy.
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than one statute, as in Thames, the second prosecution will be
allowed. But, if more than one statute is violated by the same
act or conduct, as in Bonfanti and Didier,the court will use the
same evidence test and the second prosecution will be barred.
Criminal conduct may often give rise to two or more possible
charges,4 but the constitutional and statutory rights of the defendant to protection against double jeopardy must be safeguarded. A crucial factor in insuring this protection is a workable standard for defining the same offense. The standard is
substantially clarified by the stress on both the same evidence
and same act or conduct in the instant cases.
Edward Sutherland
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SELECTION CLAUSES IN MARrrvME CONTRACTS

Respondent, an American corporation, contracted with petitioner, a German firm, for the towing of respondent's drilling
rig from Louisiana to the Adriatic. The contract contained provisions relieving petitioner from liability for damages suffered
by the tow,' and a clause stating: "Any dispute arising must
be treated before the London Court of Justice." While in tow
the rig was damaged, and respondent libelled petitioner in
personam and petitioner's tug Bremen in rem. Petitioner's motion to dismiss or stay the action pending adjudication in London, where the exculpatory provisions would be enforced, was
denied. 2 The Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal,8 relying on an
earlier decision that jurisdictional clauses providing for an
exclusive forum were contrary to public policy and hence un43. See LA. R.S. 14:4 (1950) which reads in part: "Prosecution may pro-

ceed under either provision, in the discretion of the district attorney, whenever an offender's conduct is: (1) Criminal according to a general article of
this Code or Section of this Chapter of the Revised Statutes and also
according to a special article of this Code or Section of this Chapter of
the Revised Statutes; or (2) Criminal according to an article of the Code
or Section of this Chapter of the Revised Statutes and also according to
some other provision of the Revised Statutes, some special statute, or some
constitutional provision."
1. The contract contained the following provisions: "1. . . . Unterweser
and its masters and crews are not responsible for defaults and/or errors In
the navigation of the tow. 2. ... b) Damages suffered by the towed object
are in any case for the account of Its owners."
2. In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 296 F. Supp. 733 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
3. In re Unterweser Reederel, GMBH, 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd
mem., 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971).

